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RECENT CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL LAw-EVIDENCE-WITNESSES--PRIVILEGED COMM[UNICATIONS--
SEARCHES AND SnIzuR.--Appellant was found guilty of murder in the first
degree and sentenced to prison for life. Appellant appeals alleging as error
that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence. His wife was per-
mitted to testify over appellant's objections, that she saw her husband
carry a trunk in a wheel-barrow and dump some object into a hole, in
which the body of the deceased was later found. The contention of appel-
lant was that the testimony of his wife was not admissible for the reason
that it was privileged communication, but the court, Held: The act to which
his wife had testified to, was not a confidential communication, because
the evidence showed in the trial court that he had shielded the contents of
the trunk from her knowledge. Appellant also objected to admission of
the testimony of the sheriff, to disclose what the sheriff had found in the
search of the premises, by virtue of a search warrant, contending that
service at the place designated in the warrant, and the consent of his
wife to such search was not sufficient because the property was held by
entireties, and there was no service on both. Held: That service at the
place designated in the warrant itself was sufficient. Smith v. State,
Supreme Court of Indiana, June 24, 1926, 152 N. E. 803.
It is well settled that under the common law one spouse could not be
introduced to establish a crime against the other, except where the crime
was committed against the other. Cohen v. United States, 35 S. Ct. 199.
But in Indiana by statute and judicial construction the courts have modified
the rule until today only a few remnants of the original privilege is left.
Sections 548, 549, 2267, Burns', 1926. The principal case follows the
weight of authority in the United States. Cohen v. United States, supra;
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Mason, 272 F. 28. Wigmore on Evidence
(Section 2236), in discussing statutes of this character (privileged com-
munications), says: "In many jurisdictions this fundamental element of
confidence is not expressly named in the statutory enactment: it privileges
any communication. Some courts, however, have construed this phrase in
the spirit of the correct principle, and have implied a limitation to confi-
dential communications. Others have literally applied the words of the
statute, which is thus allowed to create an intolerable anomaly in the law
of privilege communications. No justification for such an extension of the
privilege has ever been attempted, and it must be supposed that this broad
statute phrasing originated in advertence." A communication is not inad-
missible where it appears to have been made in the presence of others.
Gifford v. Gifford, 58 Ind. A. 665, 107 N. E. 308. Acts as well as words
are held to be communications. Smith v. State, supra; Perry v. Randall,
83 Ind. 143.
The same principle not only applies to husband and wife, but to other
statutory privileged communications. Conklin v. Dougherty, 44 Ind. A. 570,
89 N. E. 893. In conclusion, one may say that Indiana not only follows
the weight of authority, but the better line of reasoning, in holding that
our statute only protects confidential communication between husband and
wife, which grow out of the marital relation, and which but for such
relation would not have been communicated. J.0. H.
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FALSE PRETENSES-POSTDATED CHECK-STATUTES.-A prosecution under
the Indiana statute "making it unlawful to obtain money,-or a thing
of value by means of a check,-where the maker or drawer has not suffi-
cient funds in or credit with the bank,--for the payment of same-." The
affidavit alleged that appellant being indebted to a firm in the sum of
$747.64 for goods theretofore purchased and received, drew a check in
payment, dated Sept. 26, 1924, not knowing that he had, and not having,
sufficient funds or credit with the bank for the payment of such check.
A motion to quash this affidavit was overruled and appellant excepted.
The undisputed evidence was that the check was given on Sept. 17, 1924,
in payment of an account of goods purchased seven months before; that
it was dated ahead at the request of the payee after defendant had told
him he did not have the money to meet it; that defendant on Sept. 25,
and again four days later, asked the payee to hold the check; that the
payee sent the check to the bank for collection on Oct. 15, 1924, but
defendant still had no funds in spite of his bona fide intentions. The Ripley
Circuit Court found the defendant guilty and he challenged the sufficiency
of the evidence by a motion for a new trial. Held: The evidence is not
sufficient to sustain the finding of guilty, the Attorney-General admitting
that so much of Section 2949, Burns' 1926, as purports to declare it a
criminal offense to give a check "in payment of an obligation" is not within
the title of the act and is therefore unconstiutional. Judgment reversed.
Nedderman v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, June 25, 1926, 152 N. E.
800.
Giving a postdated check under an agreement that it shall not be pre-
sented for payment until the day it is dated, does not constitute a false
pretense as to any present fact and amounts to nothing more than a
promise by the drawer to have the money at the bank for the payment of
the check at the future date. Brown v. State, 166 Ind. 85, 88, 76 N. E. 881;
State v. Ferris, 171 Ind. 562, 86 N. E. 993. A false pretense, to constitute
a crime within our statutes, must rest upon some existing fact. "Both
in the nature of things and in actual adjudication, the doctrine is, that
no representation of a future event, whether in the form of a promise
or not, can be a pretense within the statute; for it must relate either to
the past or the present." 2 Bishop-Criminal Law (7th Ed.), Sec. 420.
The subject expressed in the title of the act in question is obtaining
money, merchandise, property, credit or a thing of value by means of a
check, etc. This prosecution was based on language in the body of the
act relating to the payment of any "obligation" by check, etc.
A statute is valid only as far as its provisions relate to the subject
expressed in the title and matters properly connected therewith. Sec. 19,
Art. 4, Constitution Indiana (Sec. 122, Burns' 1926).
It has been said that if the title of an act fairly gives notice, so as to
reasonably lead to an inquiry into the body of the bill, that is all that is
necessary. It need not amount to an abstract of its contents. State v.
Arnold, 140 Ind. 628, 38 N. E. 820. Even viewing the act in this way,
however, it seems that the confession of errors and order to quash the
indictment were proper. In payment of an obligation by check nothing
of value is received at the time, for the long established rule in Indiana
is that the giving and taking of a check is prima facie a conditional pay-
ment only, and not absolute. Sutton v. Baldwin, 146 Ind. 364; Boyd V.
Olvey, 82 Ind. 294. But if by agreement the parties had made the check
absolute payment of the account for which it was given, could it then be
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held that nothing of value had been obtained? By so doing would not the
defendant have extinguished his civil obligation of $747.64 and have in-
curred criminal liability of a fine of $100 to $5,000, and from one to five
years in prison? C. F. R.
SALEs--BREACH OF CONTRACT-SELLER'S RIGHTS-APPELLANT.-The Na-
tional Importing Company entered into a written contract with the appel-
lee, by the terms of which the appellant purchased of appellee a quantity
of prunes to be shipped from California to Indianapolis, Indiana, consigned
to order of seller. Prunes were shipped and a draft for purchase price
was presented to appellant, as per .contract. Appellant refused to pay for
or receive the prunes. Appellee stored them for appellant and notified
appellant that at a certain time and place the prunes would be sold for
his benefit, and appellant would be held responsible for difference between
contract price and sale price. This suit is to recover the difference between
the contract price and the sale price plus costs of the sale. Appellant
admits the contract, shipment of the prunes and his refusal to accept but
contends that it was an executory contract, and not executed, and the
decision of the court cannot be sustained because there was no evidence as
to market value of prunes at place of delivery. Held: Judgment of $943.40
should be affirmed. Appellee performed all the provisions of the contract
and did everything called upon to do, to place title in appellant. Appellant
having breached the contract, appellee sold the prunes as the agent of the
appellant and applied the proceeds to the account, and sued for difference
between contract price and resale price. National Importing Company
and Others v. California Prune and Apricot Growers, Appellate Court of
Indiana, April 27, 1926, 151 N. E. 626.
Where buyer breaches contract fully executed by seller, latter may store
property as for purchaser, and sue for price, or he may sell and apply
proceeds to account, and sue for difference, or he may keep the property
and recover difference between market and contract price at place and
time of delivery. National Importing Co. v. California Prune and Apricot
Growers, 151 N. E. 626; Liberty Canning Company v. Lippincott Company,
80 Ind. App. 184, 137 N. E. 283; Taylor v. Capp et al., 68 Ind. App. 593,
121 N E 37; Dill v Mumford et al, 19 Ind. App. 609, 49 N. E. 592; Dwiggins
v. Clazk, 94 Ind. 49; Fell et al, v. Muller, 78 Ind. 507; Williston on Con-
tracts, Secs. 1365, 1372. In action of seller for breach, after disposing of
property and applying proceeds to account, proof of market price at time
and place of delivery is immaterial, damage being the difference in resale
and contract price if the vendor keeps goods as belonging to vendee.
Taylor v. Capp et al., 68 Ind. App. 593, 121 N. E. 37. If contract is
executory and goods still belong to vendor, the measure of damages is the
difference between contract price and market price of goods at time when
and place where the contract should have been performed. Ridgley v.
Mooney et al., 45 N. E. 348, 16 Ind. App. 362; Williston on Sales, Sec. 582-3.
A seller, who retakes goods delivered to a buyer, and for which he refuses
to pay, in order to recover the difference in the contract price and what
he may secure from a resale, must give the buyer notice of the proposed
sale of the recovered goods, unless perishable. Ridgley V. Mooney et al.,
16 Ind. App. 362, 45 N. E. 348; Williston on Sales, Sees. 543 and 550. The
right of action depends on substantial performance of contract by seller,
and he cannot recover the price unless there has been a delivery or tender,
actual or constructive. Shipps v. Atkinson, 8 Ind. App. 505, 36 N. E. 375;
Indianapolis, Peru and Chicago Ry. Co. v. Maguire, 62 Ind. 140; Fell et al.
v. Muller, 78 Ind. 507; Neal et al. v. Shewalter et al., 5 Ind. App. 147,
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31 N. E. 851. Where seller on buyer's breach chooses to retain property
and sell it for buyer's account, and recover difference between resale price
and contract price, the averments in complaint must be such as to show
that he retained possession for the buyer. Pillsbury Flour Mills Co. v.
Walsh et al., 60 Ind. App. 76, 110 N. E. 96; National Importing Co. et al. v.
California Prune and Apricot Growers, 151 N. E. 626. A. E. B.
WILLS-GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS Appellant, as the administrator of the
estate of Amy W. Rule, deceased, brought this action, seeking to recover
certain personal property which he alleged belonged to the estate. De-
ceased knew some time in advance that it would be necessary for her to
undergo a serious surgical operation from which her recovery would be
doubtful according to her own statement. Prior to the operation she rented
a lock-box in the safety deposit vault at the Indiana National Bank taking
the title in her own name or the appellee who was her brother and placed
therein certain personal property, the object of this suit. She also placed
a note of directions concerning the distribution of the property in the
box. She received two keys, one of which she sent in a letter to appellee
along with a note of directions for the disposal of the property which
was received by him before her death. In a conversation with a third
party who was a witness in the suit she had indicated that she had
arranged for the disposal of her property by the note which she had placed
in the lock box. In the court below this was held to be valid as a gift
causa mortis which decision is affirmed in this court. Rule v. Fleming.
Decided in Indiana Appellate Court, June 2, 1926. 152 N. E. 181.
A gift causa mortis is a gift of personal property, made by the donor
under apprehension of impending death, effectuated by delivery, and de-
feasible by resumption by the donor, his recovery from that which occa-
sioned his apprehension, or the prior death of the donee. Gardner on
Wills, p. 10. Clearly from the weight of authority if anything is left
to be done after the decease of the donor, it is an attempted testamentary
disposition rather than a gift and is invalid. Smith v. Ferguson, 90 Ind.
229; Martin v. Seibert, 71 Ind. App. 564. The present title must vest in
the donee, revocable only upon the recovery of the donor. This vesting
of title is accomplished by delivery; it may be actual, by handing over
the subject of the gift, or constructive, by delivery of the means of obtain-
ing possession. Caylor v. Caylor, 22 Ind. App. 666. Delivery is not used
in the narrow sense of requiring a manual delivery of the chattel into the
hands of the recipient but delivery of a key where it is the means of
obtaining possession of the gift has been held sufficient. Coleman v. Parker,
114 Mass. 30; Wing v. Merchant, 57 Me. 383; Devol v. Dye, 123 Ind. 321.
It seems evident in this case that the appellee could have taken actual
and exclusive possession of the litigated property at any time after the
delivery to him of the key to the lock box. Deceased had done everything
in her power to invest him with this right and nothing in her behalf
remained to be done after her death. The donor must be in such a condi-
tion to fear approaching death from a proximate and impending peril
and death from such cause will complete the gift. Smith v. Dorsey, 38
Ind. 451; Devol v. Dye, 123 Ind. 321. In this case all of the requirements
of a gift causa mortis are found and it would seem from a review of the
authorities on this principle of the law that a correct decision was reached
by the court. Upon consideration of the adjudicated cases it appears that
the courts have entertained a distrust for this method of alienating prop-
erty and that each case must be thoroughly considered on its own facts.
R. M. C.
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SUPREME COURT
24903 GREGG ALYEA V. STATE. Rush County. Petition denied. Willough-
by, 3. October 27, 1926.
Where a court denies a petition and it does not appear that evidence was
heard it must be assumed that the court held the allegation in the petition
to be untrue while in law all such allegations must be presumed to be true.
24757 EARL BooHER ET AL. V. STATE. Greene County. Affirmed. Gem-
mill, J. October 15, 1926.
Where the indictment is for conspiracy to commit a felony and the
felony is the illegal transportation of intoxicating liquor it is proper for
the purpose of showing the necessary intent to admit evidence of the
defendant's dealings with intoxicating liquor even before such dealing was
a felony under the Indiana law. The rule for admission of evidence to show
intent is wider in conspiracy cases than in most criminal cases.
25111 OTHO BRONNENBERG V. STATE. Madison County. Affirmed. Ewbank,
J. October 15, 1926.
A verdict which found the defendant "guilty as charged in the affidavit
and that he be fined in the sum of $500 and confined in the county jail for
the period of six months" is not defective for uncertainty under Section
12347, Burns' 1926.
25057 ARCHIE CAMPBELL V. STATE. Delaware County. Affirmed. Gem-
mill, .J. October 6, 1926.
Where by agreement several offences were consolidated and tried at one
time it is proper for the jury to bring in as many separate verdicts as
there are separate offenses charged.
25076 JEFF FARR V. STATE. Monroe County. Reversed. Myers, C. J.
October 13, 1926.
Where the defendant is charged with several offenses in dealing with
intoxicating liquor and the findings of the court are that he is guilty of
selling intoxicating liquor and not guilty of the other charges these findings
cannot be sustained unless there is some evidence in the record of an actual
sale.
25301 FOSTER & BuRcHARD STONE COMPANY ET AL. V. MARION NATIONAL
BANK. Howard County. Affirmed. Per Curiam. October 5, 1926.
A sub-contractor is not barred from acquiring and foreclosing a lien
merely because the principal contract stipulated that the main contractor
would secure the release of any mechanic's liens within twenty days. But
when the sub-contractor enters into a contract with the contractor agreeing
to turn over the work free from all liens it thereby waives all right to
enforce the lien against the property in view of the provision in the main
contract of which it had knowledge.
24855 FRITZ V. STATE. Howard County. Affirmed. Myers, C. J. October
6, 1926.
Where no independent bill of exception is filed covering the misconduct of
counsel in the closing argument this matter cannot be reviewed on appeal;
and where no bill of exception containing the instructions complained of
is filed these likewise cannot be considered on appeal.
192
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25017 ALBERT GIELOw v. STATE. LaPort6 County. Affirmed. Gemmill, J.
October 7, 1926.
While it is true that the mere possession of liquor is not a crime it was
not reversible error for the court to refuse to give an instruction covering
this in a case where the mere possession was not the foundation for the
prosecution.
25035 HENRY GREENING V. STATE. St. Joseph County. Affirmed. Gem-
mill, J. October 8, 1926.
Where the defendant is charged with obtaining money under false pre-
tenses it is sufficient if his criminal acts in obtaining money were part of
the enducement for the paying of money.
24599 GUETLING V. STATE. Gibson County. Affirmed. Myers, C. J. Oc-
tober 26, 1926.
Where one is carrying sugar that could be used for distilling purposes
near a lonely spot where a still had been found and raided, this was
sufficient evidence to warrant conviction under a statute which makes it
unlawful to "aid or encourage, etc.," in making of liquor in violation of
law.
24600 GUETLING V. STATE. Gibson County. Affirmed. Myers, C. J. Octo-
ber 26, 1926.
Where one is carrying sugar that could be used for distilling purposes
near a lonely spot where a still had been found and raided this was sufficient
evidence to warrant conviction under a statute which makes it unlawful to
"aid or encourage, etc.," in making of liquor in violation of law.
24982 T. J. HAYS ET AL. V. THos. BENNINGTON ET AL. Daviess County.
Petition denied. Ewbank, J. October 15, 1926.
Where no evidence against the ruling of the lower court is presented in
the bill of exception it must be presumed that the lower court acted on
some evidence introduced at the trial.
24867 GEORGE T. INSKEEP ET AL. V. STATE EX REL. NEEs ET AL. White Coun-
ty. Affirmed. Myers, C. J. October 5, 1926.
Objecting petitioners to an assessment for the construction of public
improvements by county commissioners must intervene in the proceedings if
at all within fifteen days after which the commissioners determine to issue
the bonds. Where the commissioners indicate, however, that this would
not appear from the previous litigation it would have been proper though
not compulsory to have admitted the intervention of the objecting peti-
tioner.
25096 LINDLEY V. STATE. Delaware County. Reversed. Ewbank, J. Oc-
tober 26, 1926.
Under the Indiana statute which requires that the court must give writ-
ten instructions if so requested by counsel, it is error to give oral instruc-
tions also since it might mislead the jury as to their relative weight.
25029 CLEVE V. STATE. Gibson County. Affirmed. Ewbank, J. October 7,
1926.
A court might not give instructions unless they are pertinent to the
law and facts as developed at the trial. Thus if there is direct evidence of
certain acts upon which the indictment is laid the court might not give
instructions about the use of circumstantial evidence.
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25311 FRED J. MUoG ET AL. V. CAS. E. FENN RT AL. Howard County.
Affirmed. Gemmill, J. October 28, 1926.
Where a widow has a certain portion of land set off to her under order
of court in lieu of $500.00 to which she was entitled, this land comes to her
by purchase and not by descent and children of the marriage cannot claim
an interest in such land.
24738 Roy MURRY V. STATE. Grant County. Affirmed. Myers, C. J., Oc-
tober 29, 1926.
If evidence of transportation of intoxicating liquor is obtained without
a warrant or without direct evidence before the search this cannot be raised
on appeal unless the objection to the admission of the liquor as evidence is
made on this basis.
25313 ALFRED NEAL ET AL. v. BESSIE F. BAKER. Sullivan County. Re-
versed. Per Curicm. October 29, 1926.
A letter in which the decedents promised to give the plaintiff a farm and
asked her to return to them was held not to show a sufficient consideration in
return for the land according to the written instrument which could be a
basis for specific performance later. Furthermore this cannot be enforced
as a gift of the land where the plaintiff did not take possession and make
improvements. See section 8045, Burns, 1926.
24499 NEW YORK, CHICAGO & ST. Louis RAILROAD COMPANY v. FIRST TRUST
& SAVINGS BANK, ADMINISTRATOR. Lake County. Affirmed. Ew-
bank, J. October 28, 1926.
Where the instructions that are covered on appeal are filed as a part of
the record by order of the trial judge there immediately follows he memo-
randa signed by the judge. This is a sufficient compliance with the statute
requiring an incorporation in the record of all errors complained of under
section 717 Burns, 1926.
24695 OTIS SPROUT V. CITY OF SOUTH BEND. St. Joseph County. Affirmed.
Ewbank, J. October 14, 1926.
A city may validly license and regulate a commercial bus line even
though such a line does not operate exclusively within the city or the state
and even though its main business is interstate. Since the bus line uses the
city streets for commercial purposes a reasonable regulation is constitu-
tional.
25123 STATE BOARD OF TAX COMMISSIONERS, V. STATE EX REL. Indianapolis.
Marion County. Petition denied. Gemmill, J. October 26, 1926.
The tax levy under the budget law for cities in Indiana should be estab-
lished after the publishing and a public hearing. ThQ decision of courts in
other states construing the statute different from our are not applicable to
this case.
25088 STATE V. LOWDER ET AL. Green County. Reversed. Ewbank, J.
October 6, 1926.
Where defendants are charged with unlawfully using a seine to catch
fish under the Indana statute it was improper to give an instruction saying
that if the defendants used the seine to preserve the fish when the pond
was drying up he would not be guilty. No such exception appears in the
statute, section 2831, 2846 Burns 1926 and the defendant was not justify-
ing his acts as an bfficer acting to preserve the fish.
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25303 STATE EX REL. LESH, V. INDIANA MANUFACTURERS OF DAIRY PRO-
DUCTS ET L. Marion County. Affirmed. Per Curiam.
If the findings of fact by a court from conflicting evidence are not unreas-
onable they will be sustained on appeal. No conclusion of guilt can be
drawn by a witness's refusal to testify on the ground of self-inclination.
24944 STATE V. LEONARD. Miami County. Reversed. Gemmill J. Octo-
ber 27, 1926.
To prevent the issuance of bonds by a Board of County Commissioners,
the objection of tax payers must be filed within fifteen days after the entry
of the order for the issuance of the bonds.
34546 LITTLE WONDER LIGHT COMPANY V. VAN SLYKE. Vigo County. Re-*
versed. Ewbank, J. October 8, 1926.
When a corporations is solvent, paying dividends, keeping full and accu-
rate books, and its officers are residing within the state and financially re-
sponsible there must be a showing of more than disagreements on the
Board of Directors and failure to carry out employment contracts to war-
rant their appointment of a receiver.
APPELLATE COURT
12471 BANK OF SAN PIERRE, V. FRED E. ARNDT ET AL. Starke County.
Reversed. Remy, J. October 15, 1926.
Where the defendants to suit on a note for payment and the evidence of
payment is the transfer of the deed, there is not sufficient evidence to sus-
tain a verdict for defendants if the agreement of the deed itself provided
that the conveyance was to protect the owners of the note for interest and
other claims while it was not in any way to release the makers from liabil-
ity on the note itself.
12415 CHICAGO, INDIANAPOLIS & LOUISVILLE RAILWAY COMPANY V. AMER-
ICAN TRUST COMPANY. Jasper County. Reversed. Remy, J. Oc-
tober 8, 1926.
In an accident case it was error for the court to instruct the jury that
the jury was to determine whether the Railway Crossing was in a thickly
populated place when there was no evidence or allegation to this effect in
the entire procedure; furthermore, it was error for the court to instruct
the jury that the Railroad must use "all the facilities it had to give reason-
able warning of the approach" of its trains when the duty of the Railroad
was to use reasonable care only in giving warning.
12400 CHICAGO, INDIANAPOLIS & LOUISVILLE RAILWAY COMPANY V. STIER-
WALT. Monroe County. Affirmed. McMahan, P. J. October 27,
1926.
Under the United States Appliance Act there is an absolute duty imposed
on Railroads to provide their cars with such coupling that the connections be
made without the brakeman's standing between the car. If under this act an
injured employee sues and recovers $42000.00 damages, such damages are
not excessive.
12216 CITY OF PERU ET AL. V. KREUTZER ET A. Miami County. Reversed.
Nichols, J. October 7, 1926.
Where a party attempts an appeal from sewer assessment under the act
of 1919 which required a verified complaint and bond, it was reversible er-
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ror to hear such an appeal even though it would be proper under the law
as now amended.
12493 CITY NATIONAL BANK OF AUBURN V. EDGAR VAN HOUTEN ET AL. De-
kalb County. Reversed. Nichols, J. October 27, 1926.
Where a land owner has waived all objections to an assessment for build-
ing a sewer he cannot later take advantage of an objection that would valid
if he had not given the waiver.
25095 ToM DAPOFF V. STATE. Marion County. -Affirmed. Willoughby, J.
October 5, 1926.
Where the defendants were arrested for speeding in driving their au-
tomobile it was lawful for the officer to then search the car for illegal liquor
and to use the evidence thus obtained in a charge laid for violating the pro-
hibition law. Where one is arrested for a misdemeanor committed in the
presence of an officer his person and vehicle may be searched without viola-
tion of the constitutional right prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures.
24544 DENNY, RECEIVER, V. SCOONOVER. Marion County. Affirmed. Nich-
ols, J. October 27, 1926.
Where a receiver for an insurance company had been appointed in Iowa
but no receiver had yet been appointed for Indiana and agent of the insur-
ance company who paid all due the company to this receiver under his order,
is not liable to the Indiana receiver appointed later.
12536 CHAUNCEY R. DOTY v. JEREMIAH W. DowD ET AL. Starke County.
Affirmed. Remy, J. October 6, 1926.
Where a court refused to enter judgment at one term withholding the
decision pending on agreement between the parties; and in fact no such
agreement is reached and the court enters judgment in the next term, such
judgment is considered as of the second term.
12430 HIGHWAY IRON PRODUCTS COMPANY V. PHILLIPS ET AL. Starke Coun-
ty. Reversed. Thompson, J. October 26, 1926.
Where the special findings of the jury did not find a change in the
original contract the court was not justified in finding as a matter of law
that the sureties on the bond incident to the contract were released.
12484 HARLEY D. HOLMES V. ALBERT BUELL. Rush County. Affirmed.
Nichols, J. October 8, 1926.
On appeal appellant will not be heard to complain of an instruction as
stating the issues insufficiently if he failed to tender an instruction which in
his opinion properly covered them.
12393 EDITH H. INTON ET AL V. GUSTAVE G. SCHMIDT ET AL. Marion Coun-
ty. Petition denied. McMahan, P. J. October 15, 1926.
No appeal lies from the decision of the circuit court or superior court in
a case under the Zoning statutes, since the statute does not expressly pro-
vide for an appeal to the appellate court and since no right of appeal is
implied in the case of causes before administrative official or board that is
reviewed by the circuit court.
12404 LEo KEPPER Er AL. V. AUGUSTA SCHUMAKER ET AL. Laporte Coun-
ty. Reversed. Nichols, J. October 8, 1926.
Where a second, childless wife takes certain property by the will of her
husband for a number of years and then the property is to go to the chil-
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dren of the testator subject to the widow's statutory interest, the widow
takes by purchase and not by descent.
12495 HANNA L. MI.LE v FORT WAYNE MERCANTILE ACCIDENT ASSOCIA-
TION. Adams County. Affirmed. McMahan, P. J. October 8, 1926.
Where under an accident insurance policy no recovery was allowed for
injury arising from "voluntary or involuntary, conscious or unconscious
inhalation of gas . . . or; from anything accidentally or otherwise
taken . . . nor for death or disability caused directly or indirectly,
wholly or in part from any poison . . .". The deceased cannot recover
if he took poison in the belief that it was medicine. Some cases hold that
a policy which provides for no recovery after death results from poison
means the conscious taking of poison; but these cases do not apply here.
12465 NATIONAL SURETY COMPANY OF NEW YORK v. STATE Ex REL. BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS. Clarke County. Reversed. Nichols, J. Octo-
ber 8, 1926.
Where a contract of suretyship is, as between the creditor and the sure-
ty, subject to a condition, the surety is discharged if the condition is not
performed.
12566 Wm. H. NICHOLS GARAGE, INC. v. FRANK J. MILLER. St. Joseph
County. Reverse& Remy, J. October 12, 1926.
Where one sues for damages and the possession of an automobile and the
jury finds on the counter claim that the defendant was entitled to $50.00
this would not amount to a finding on the question of whether or not the
plaintiff was entitled to possession of the automobile apart from damages.
12254 PEOPLES TRUST & SAVINGS BANK V. JOHN C. HENNESSEY ET AL.
Porter County. Affirmed. McMahan, P. J. October 14, 1926.
Where a property owner avails himself of the Barrett law in waiving ob-
jection to an assessment and permits the bonds to be issued on this basis
the statute of limitations will run against an action for non-payment of
the assessment. If the complaint does not set up this agreement and waiv-
er as part of the cause of action within the five year period.
12480 ELMER THOMPSON V. THE TOWN OF FORT BRANCH. Gibson County.
Affirmed. Nichols, J. October 15, 1926.
No new trial shall be granted on the ground that the damages given by the
verdict are too small in a case-involving injuries to persons or reputation.
Section 611, Burns 1926.
12240 CHARLES F. THORP, ETC. ET AL. V OGLE COAL COMPANY AND SUGAR
VALLEY COAL COMPANY. Marion County. Reversed. Nichols, J.
October 8, 1926.
Where a claimant for prudential reasons refuses to present his claim un-
der a legal obligation he cannot later come to a court of equality and ask
allowance upon it.
